



**BSI-PP-0013-2005**

**Low Assurance Protection Profile**

for a

**VPN gateway,**

**Version 1.4**

developed by

**SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH**

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**Certificate BSI-PP-0013-2005**

**Low Assurance Protection Profile  
for a VPN gateway,  
Version 1.4**



Common Criteria Arrangement

developed by

**SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH**

Assurance Package : EAL1

The President of the Federal Office  
for Information Security

Bonn, June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2005

Dr. Helmbrecht

L.S.

The Protection Profile mentioned above was evaluated at an accredited and licenced/approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.4 Revision 256 including Draft Interpretations #1 - #17 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.4, Revision 256.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the Federal Office for Information Security. The conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.



## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products as well as for Protection Profiles (PP).

A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for a category of TOEs which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT security. The development and certification of a PP or the reference to an existent one gives consumers the possibility to express their IT security needs without referring to a special product. Product or system certifications can be based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued.

Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the Protection Profile according to Common Criteria [1].

According to the decree issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) on February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2005 the BSI is authorised to issue certificates on the basis of CC, Version 2.4, Revision 256.

The evaluation is carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by the BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

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<sup>1</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

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## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011
- BSI Certification – Description of the Procedure [3]
- Procedure for the Issuance of a PP certificate by the BSI Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.4, Revision 256 [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.4, Revision 256 with the CC v2.4 Draft Interpretations #1 - #17 [2]

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<sup>2</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of July 07<sup>th</sup>, 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of March 03<sup>rd</sup>, 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

## 2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different countries a mutual recognition of Protection Profile certificates under certain conditions was agreed.

An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic of Singapore in March 2005 and India in April 2005.



### 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The Low Assurance Protection Profile for a VPN gateway, Version 1.4 has undergone the certification procedure at the BSI.

The evaluation of the Low Assurance Protection Profile for a VPN gateway, Version 1.4 was conducted by the TNO ITSEF BV. The evaluation facility of TNO ITSEF BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>5</sup> recognised by BSI.

Author is SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH.

The certification was concluded with

- the comparability check and
- the preparation of this Certification Report.

This work was completed by the BSI on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

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<sup>5</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

#### 4 Publication

The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-8.

The Low Assurance Protection Profile for a VPN gateway, Version 1.4 has been included in the BSI list of certified and registered Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see also Internet: [http:// www.bsi.bund.de](http://www.bsi.bund.de)). Further information can be obtained via the BSI-Infoline +49 228/9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report may be ordered from the BSI<sup>6</sup>. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

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<sup>6</sup> *BSI* - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn  
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## B Certification Results

### Content of the Certification Results

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## 1 PP Overview

This Low Assurance Protection Profile for a VPN gateway, Version 1.4 is established by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH as basis for the development of STs for a VPN gateway which is used to build up a virtual private network as depicted in figure 1 on the next page. A Virtual Private Network, or VPN, is a private communication network communicating over a public network, i.e. the Internet. Normally, a local network is protected against unauthorised access from the public network by means of a firewall which limits the permitted types of traffic. The TOE provides a remote authorised user a full connection into the local network without bypassing this protection against unauthorised users.

This connection is established by a so called VPN tunnel between a VPN gateway on the side of the network and a VPN client on the side of the remote user, which is a reduced form of a gateway. Also two networks can be connected via two VPN gateways, in which case, one of the VPN gateways plays the role of the server and the other gateway plays the role of the client. There is no difference in the functionality offered by the VPN client irrespective of whether the remote VPN client is actually a single personal computer running a trusted VPN client software application or a VPN gateway device attached to a remote LAN.

The TOE provides the following functionality:

- identifying and authenticating remote VPN users or networks,
- building up VPN tunnels between the TOE and the VPN client by exchanging cryptographic keys and using agreed cryptographic algorithms and
- routing network traffic between the two sides of the VPN tunnel.

The VPN message traffic is carried on public networking infrastructure using standard protocols. VPNs use cryptographic tunnelling protocols to provide the necessary confidentiality (preventing snooping), sender authentication (preventing identity spoofing), and message integrity (preventing message alteration) to achieve the privacy intended. Such techniques can provide secure communications over possibly insecure networks.

Typical VPN protocols are:

- IPsec (IP security), the most common protocol specified by an IETF working group,
- OpenVPN, a SSL based encryption available for many operating systems,
- and proprietary protocols like
  - PPTP (point-to-point tunneling protocol) or
  - L2F (Layer 2 Forwarding) as well as
  - L2TP (Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol).

The TOE requires a supporting computing platform equipped with a connection to the public network as well as the local network to provide its functionality.

Furthermore, the communication between the local network and the public network will be only through the TOE. This object will be supported by the use of a firewall that is configured to allow the minimum set of traffic to pass that is

required for the operation of the TOE and any other services that are exposed to the outside world.

Further non-TOE hardware/firmware/software is not required by the TOE.




Figure 1: The TOE and its operational environment

## 2 Security Functional Requirements

This section contains the functional requirements that must be satisfied by a TOE claiming compliance to the Low Assurance Protection Profile for a VPN gateway, Version 1.4.

All functional requirements are drawn from Common Criteria Part 2.

SFRs	Component-Name
FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2	User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action
FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles
FPT_RVM.1	Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1	TSF domain separation
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel

## 3 Assurance Package

The security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. The assurance requirements are assurance level EAL1 (Evaluation Assurance Level 1).

## 4 Strength of Functions

The strength of function examination is no more part of the CC, Version 2.4, Revision 256.

## 5 Results of the Evaluation

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the scheme [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL1 and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table.

<b>CC Aspect</b>	<b>Result</b>
CC Class APE	PASS.
APE_CCL.1	PASS.
APE_ECD.1	PASS.
APE_INT.1	PASS.
APE_OBJ.0	PASS.
APE_REQ.1	PASS.

The Low Assurance Protection Profile for a VPN gateway, Version 1.4 meets the requirements for Protection Profiles as specified in class APE and Draft Interpretation #2 of the CC, Version 2.4, Revision 256.

## 6 Definitions

### 6.1 Acronyms

<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>ITSEF</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
<b>LAPP</b>	Low Assurance Protection Profile
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>SF</b>	Security Function
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation

### 6.2 Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in Part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in Part 3 of the CC.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Protection Profile** - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

**Security Function** - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

**Security Target** - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Subject** - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.



**Target of Evaluation** - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

**TOE Security Functions** - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

**TOE Security Policy** - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

**TSF Scope of Control** - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

## 7 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.4, Revision 256
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Security Evaluation, Version 2.4, Revision 256 with the CC v2.4 Draft Interpretations #1 - #17
- [3] BSI Certification – Description of the Procedure (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149)
- [6] Low Assurance Protection Profile for a VPN gateway, Version 1.4, 29.04.2005
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), Version 2.0, 01.06.2005

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**Annex: Protection Profile**